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Abstract: To contain expenditures in an increasingly demand driven health care
system, in 2005 a no-claim rebate was introduced in the Dutch health insurance
system. Since demand-side cost sharing is a very controversial issue, the no-claim
rebate was launched as a consumer friendly bonus system to reward prudent
utilization of health services. Internationally, the introduction of a mandatory
no-claim rebate in a social health insurance scheme is unprecedented. Consumers
were entitled to an annual rebate of e 255 if no claims were made. During the
year, all health care expenses except for GP visits and maternity care were
deducted from the rebate until the rebate became zero. In this article, we discuss
the rationale of the no-claim rebate and the available evidence of its effect. Using
a questionnaire in a convenience sample, we examined people’s knowledge,
attitudes, and sensitivity to the incentive scheme. We find that only 4% of
respondents stated that they would reduce consumption because of the no-claim
rebate. Respondents also indicated that they were willing to accept a high loss of
rebate in order to use a medical treatment. However, during the last month of
the year many respondents seemed willing to postpone consumption until the
next year in order to keep the rebate of the current year intact. A small majority
of respondents considered the no-claim rebate to be unfair. Finally, we briefly
discuss why in 2008 the no-claim rebate was replaced by a mandatory
deductible.
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1. Introduction
Many countries struggle to improve the performance of their health care systems,
while containing costs. The Netherlands is no different in this respect. The Dutch
reforms follow the international trend of health care systems towards incentives
and competition (Cutler, 2002), making the system more demand driven.
In 2006, a new universal mandatory insurance scheme was introduced, requiring
all Dutch citizens to buy standardized individual health insurance coverage from
a private insurer (Ministry of Health, 2006a; Van de Ven and Schut, 2008). The
aim is to replace supply-side regulation by a managed competition scheme in
which competing health insurers act as prudent buyers of health services. Insurers
are allowed to selectively contract or integrate with health care providers and
have to accept any applicant at a community rated premium. A Risk Equalization
Fund (REF) compensates insurers for enrollees with predictably high medical
expenses. Gradually, the supply-side constraints are being relaxed and replaced
through demand-side constraints by increasing the cost-consciousness of buyers,
both consumers and health insurers.
However, in the Dutch context increasing cost consciousness through cost-
sharing arrangements has always been politically a very controversial issue
because of its negative redistributive effects for the unhealthy poor. In the pre-
vious social health insurance scheme that covered lower- and middle-income
groups, several co-payment schedules were introduced, but were all soon abol-
ished. Since the degree of cost sharing was typically very modest and the various
co-payment schedules were often poorly designed, the impact on health care
expenditure was negligible (Schut and Van de Ven, 2005). Moreover, because
of all types of exemptions and compensation payments to mitigate the negative
redistributive effects for the elderly and chronically ill, the administrative costs
of the schemes tended to outweigh the savings on medical consumption. The
apparent ineffectiveness and administrative complexity contributed to the gen-
eral unpopularity of the various cost-sharing arrangements and most co-pay-
ment schedules did not survive a change of government. As a consequence,
demand constraints have played only a marginal role in containing costs as
compared to supply-side constraints (Schut and Van de Ven, 2005).
In view of the previous unsuccessful attempts, the Dutch government opted for
a ‘consumer friendly’ method of cost sharing in social health insurance. Instead of
a ‘penalty’ for using health services – as in the case of co-payments and deducti-
bles – the government proposed the introduction of a ‘bonus’ for not using health
services. During a calendar year, people incurring less health care costs than a cer-
tain threshold (e 255), would be entitled to receive the difference between their
annual expenses and the threshold in the form of a ‘no-claim rebate’. Since the
average expected no-claim rebate that had to be paid by health insurers was
about e90, the average premium had to be raised by that amount (Ministry of
Health, 2006c). In this sense, the no-claim rebate is exactly the opposite of a
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deductible, where the premium can be reduced because of increased out-
of-pocket payments. Although the redistributive effects of the no-claim rebate
are similar to that of a deductible, a perceived advantage of the no-claim rebate
was that, contrary to a deductible, there would be no financial barrier to care
use at the moment of health care need (Ministry of Health, 2004).
In anticipation of the introduction of the new Health Insurance Act in 2006,
the no-claim rebate was already introduced in the former social health insur-
ance scheme (Sickness Fund Act) in 2005. Despite its more friendly appearance,
the introduction of the no-claim rebate encountered substantial opposition,
which forced the government to exempt GP services from the scheme. In
2006, the no-claim rebate was included in the new health insurance scheme
for the entire Dutch population. Some key financial flows within the new health
insurance system are highlighted in Figure 1.
Although there were some experiments with no-claim rebates and bonus
options in Switzerland, Germany and by some Dutch private health insurers,
these experiments were on a very small scale and typically short-lived (Zweifel,
1987, Groenewegen and De Jong, 2004). Internationally, the introduction of a
mandatory no-claim rebate in a social health insurance scheme for an entire
population is unprecedented.
The central aim of this article is to examine the effects of the no-claim rebate
on health care utilization, and to investigate people’s knowledge of, and
their attitude and sensitivity towards the no-claim rebate scheme. We first dis-
cuss the prior expectations about the scheme and the available evaluative stud-
ies regarding effects of the no-claim rebate. Next, we present and discuss the
results of a survey we conducted among a convenience sample of the Dutch
population. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings.
At the time of writing, one may consider this article as reporting on a
failed social experiment in the Dutch health care sector, since the new Dutch
Figure 1. Key financial flows in the new health insurance system (2007)
Insured
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Risk equalization 
fund 
Community rated premiums 
Risk adjusted capitation payments
Contractual 
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No-claim rebates
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government has decided to replace the no-claim rebate with a traditional, man-
datory deductible of e150 in 2008. This decision has much to do with the
experiences of the no-claim rebate. Hence, the Dutch experience may be of
interest to other countries considering innovative methods of demand-side
cost sharing as a means to contain health care expenditure.
2. The no-claim rebate
The no-claim rebate differs in important ways from traditional cost-sharing
methods, such as co-payments, coinsurance, and deductibles. First, traditional
cost-sharing methods involve a direct financial threshold for the insured,
whereas the no-claim rebate does not. At the point of consumption, care is still
free of charge. Second, cost sharing is a negative incentive (one has to pay),
while the no-claim rebate is a positive one (one may receive something back).
Third, unlike many user fee schemes involving immediate payment, the incent-
ive of the no-claim was delayed. The insured did not receive their rebate until
several months into the next year, after (most of) the annual medical claims
were processed.1
Predicted effects before introduction
Before the introduction of the no-claim rebate, the financial effects of the
scheme were projected by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
(CPB). Since the behavioural effects of a no-claim rebate were unknown, the
impact on health care costs was assumed to be equal to that of a similar deduct-
ible. Under that strong assumption, the no-claim rebate was projected to result
in a cost reduction of e200 million per year (CPB, 2004), which would amount
to about 1% of the relevant expenditures.2 Given the above-mentioned differ-
ences between the no-claim rebate and a traditional deductible, this assumption
is likely to produce an overestimation of potential cost savings. The features of
the no-claim rebate, such as the weak link between usage and payment, the
strongly delayed incentives and the fact that people react more strongly to
potential losses (deductibles) than to profits (no-claim rebates), are likely to
diminish its effectiveness of reducing health care consumption (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Schut, 2004; Baarsma et al., 2004).
The political compromise of excluding GP-services from the no-claim scheme
also reduced its expected impact on health care utilization, since empirical
1 By law, the rebate has to be remitted in April the following year. Since most but not all medical claims
are processed by then, some insured have to pay back part of their refund. During the year, health
insurers inform consumers after medical care has been used how much of their rebate remains.
2 Moreover, the no-claim rebate would result in a shift of e1.4 billion from public to private expendit-
ure. This shift was important for political reasons, since only public expenditure falls under the scope of
the Stability and Growth Pact of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
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research demonstrates that people are most price sensitive to GP-services and
GPs have an important referral function in the Dutch health care system
(Van Vliet, 2004).
Finally, some observers pointed at the possibility that the no-claim rebate
offers an incentive to postpone care at the end of the year if the rebate is still
intact.
In sum, beforehand, the effects of the no-claim rebate on health care utiliza-
tion were expected to be limited. In the absence of a significant effect on health
care costs, its main effects would be a redistribution of wealth from the sick to
the healthy, and a shift from public to private expenditure.
First evaluations of the no-claim rebate
Several studies have been performed to evaluate the first effects of the no-claim
rebate. In April 2006, just after the payments of the no-claim rebates related to
the year 2005 were made, the Netherlands Institute for Health Services
Research (NIVEL) performed a study amongst some 1,500 citizens (de Jong
et al., 2006; Goudriaan et al., 2006). The results indicated that although 88%
of the respondents were familiar with the no-claim rebate, only 3% indicated
that they had used less care because of the no-claim rebate. They reduced the
number of visits both to GPs and to medical specialists, which is remarkable
given that the GP visits were excluded from the no-claim rebate. A possible
explanation for this is that patients reduced their visits to the GP in order to
avoid follow-up costs. An alternative explanation, however, is that consumers
were not sufficiently informed about the details of the scheme. Indeed,
Goudriaan et al. (2006) found that despite the fact that people reported that
they were familiar with the no-claim rebate, they lacked detailed knowledge.
Only 58% of respondents knew that GPs were excluded from the no-claim
rebate, and less than one-third (27%) appeared to be well informed about
which care items were included in or excluded from the no-claim rebate.
Another interesting finding was that, while respondents indicated that they
would not reduce their own care utilization because of the no-claim, they did
expect that others would use less care to keep the no-claim rebate intact (de
Jong, 2006).
Another study, amongst physicians, showed that 25% of physicians had
encountered patients who, because of financial concerns, did not want to be
referred (Wijlick and de Rond, 2006). However, since the number of patients
per physician with such concerns was generally very small (i.e. less than five),
the impact on health care utilization was likely to be small too.
The distributional effects of the no-claim rebate were calculated by Vektis
(2006), the statistical bureau of the Dutch health insurers and are depicted in
Figure 2.
As shown in Figure 2 the average no-claim rebate refund in 2007 (concerning
the year 2006) was e91. For the (self-)employed the average refund was e117,
Some pain, no gain 409
for those using any health care the average rebate was about e60, for the eld-
erly the refund was only about e30, while for the chronically ill the refund was
negligible (e 1). As expected, the scheme involved a transfer of money from the
sick to the healthy. The government stressed that this transfer should be evalu-
ated in relation to the overall solidarity of the health care system (Ministry of
Health, 2006b). The average health care expenditure for the most expensive
10% of users is e15,500 per year, while if they pay an average total premium,
they contribute ‘only’ some e2,200.3 This group therefore ‘receives’ e 13,200
as a solidarity contribution. Healthy citizens who do not use care on average
pay a premium of e2,200 and receive e255 as a no-claim rebate, which means
they pay a e 1,945 solidarity contribution. The government also pointed out
that from an international perspective the total share of out-of-pocket expenses
in the Netherlands is relatively low, about 11% (Ministry of Health, 2006b).
The final evaluation of the no-claim scheme was published in September
2007 (Goudriaan et al., 2007), largely repeating the previous study by
Goudriaan et al. (2006). In addition, this study investigated in more detail the
effects on real behaviour by studying claims data. It concluded that knowledge
regarding the no-claim scheme had not improved. As in the previous study, still
only 58% of respondents were aware that GP visits were not included in the no-
claim scheme. Some 5% of respondents indicated that they had reduced care
3 On average about half of this is paid through an income-related contribution, while the other half is
paid through a community-rated premium (see Figure 1). About two-thirds of the population is entitled
to receive an income-related subsidy to ensure that everyone can afford the community-rated premium.
Figure 2. Average no-claim rebate refunds over 2006
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consumption due to the no-claim rebate, which share was twice as high as in the
previous study (2.6%). Goudriaan et al. (2007) attributed this increase to a
learning effect amongst the previously socially insured and the fact that the pre-
viously privately insured were used to voluntary deductibles and therefore prob-
ably were more aware of and familiar with such financial incentives. Almost
70% of the GPs that responded to the survey did not expect the no-claim to
reduce health care consumption, but still almost one in four GPs indicated to
fear that it would lead to a reduction in or postponement of necessary care.
Due to a lot of other disturbing factors, Goudriaan et al. (2007) were
not able to establish a causal relationship between changes in consumption
and the no-claim rebate.
3. Methods and data
In the second half of 2006 we conducted a survey among the Dutch general
public to investigate their (i) knowledge, (ii) attitude, and (iii) sensitivity to
the no-claim rebate scheme. For this explorative study, we used a convenience
sample stratified according to gender, age, civil status, children, and income.
The respondents were recruited in the Rotterdam area in several public places,
including a sports club and the university campus, which may involve some se-
lection bias. A total of 182 respondents aged between 18 and 91 participated in
the study out of some 300 respondents approached (see Table 1). As shown in
Table 1, compared to the general Dutch population the sample is relatively
young and healthy. In addition, our recruitment strategy may also have resulted
in some self-selection bias, for instance if people who were willing to participate
in the survey were more interested in the no-claim rebate or health insurance
than other people with similar characteristics as reported in Table 1.
Respondents were asked to report both on actual behaviour to examine
revealed preferences and to react to hypothetical scenarios to elicit stated prefer-
ences. The main aim of this study, however, is to examine the stated preferences.
First, knowledge of the no-claim rebate scheme was assessed by asking
respondents whether they knew about the introduction of the no-claim rebate
and, if they did, presenting them with seven statements about the scheme, which
they were asked to evaluate as true or false (see Table 2).
These questions were used to construct a knowledge scale (n ¼ 182;
Cronbach’s a: 0.63, which is considered adequate for the purpose of our study).
Respondents who did not know the rebate had been introduced (n ¼ 21;
11.5%), or indicated they knew about it yet scored all seven follow-up state-
ments wrong (n ¼ 4; 2.5%) received a knowledge score of 0; those who
knew about the introduction of the rebate and scored all seven statements cor-
rect (n ¼ 32; 19.9%) received a knowledge score of 7. The mean (SD) know-
ledge score was 4.5 (2.2).
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Second, respondents’ attitude toward the no-claim rebate policy was assessed
using 13 statements regarding its features in terms of effectiveness and fairness
(see Table 3). Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on a 4-level
Likert-type scale, ranging from ‘totally agree’ to ‘totally disagree’. Factor analysis4
was applied to analyze whether dominant attitudes towards the no-claim existed.
4 Extraction method: Principal component analysis; Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normaliza-
tion.
Table 1. Sample characteristics (n ¼182)
Variable Sample Populationa
N (%) (%)
Gender Female 96 (52.7) 51.1
Male 86 (47.3) 48.9
Age < 30 63 (34.6) 15.8
30–40 27 (14.8) 19.7
40–50 46 (25.3) 20.5
50–60 25 (13.7) 18.3
60–70 8 (4.4) 12.4
70–80 7 (3.8) 8.5
> 90 6 (3.3) 4.7
Children No 87 (47.8)
Yes 95 (52.2)
Civil status living single 81 (44.5) 57.7
living together 101 (55.5) 42.3
Net income <1500 71 (39.0)
>1500 111 (61.0)
Health status Very good 59 (32.4) 21.6
Good 113 (62.1) 55.8
Less than good 10 (5.5) 22.6
Do you have an ailment for which you
currently need care?
No 145 (79.7)
Yes 37 (20.3)
Do you have a chronic ailment? No 139 (76.4)
Yes 43 (23.6)
Do you use medication daily? No 137 (75.3)
Yes 45 (24.7)
Have you been to a GP this in 2006? No 60 (33.0) 25.8
Yes 122 (67.0) 74.2
Have you made use of health care services
other than GP in 2006?
No 80 (44.0)
Yes b 102 (56.0)
Notes: a source www.cbs.nl; statistics for population aged 20þ; only available statistics with similar
definition shown.
b hospital care: 8 (4.4); outpatient care: 27 (14.8); specialist: 41 (22.5); physiotherapy: 32 (17.6);
diagnostic tests: 27 (14.8); prescribed medication: 43 (23.6).
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Third, sensitivity to the no-claim rebate policy was assessed in terms of indi-
viduals’ willingness to accept (WTA) a loss in rebate for the use of certain
health care services (GP visits, lung X-rays, and penicillin), and their willingness
to postpone (WTPP) care consumption until the next year in order to keep
the no-claim rebate of the current year intact (Wijlick and de Rond, 2006;
Goudriaan et al., 2006, 2007). WTA was assessed by presenting respondents
with three consecutive scenario’s (see Table 4).
Respondents were asked to indicate what size of deduction from their no-
claim rebate they would surely accept in the hypothetical situation, using a pay-
ment scale (monetary values: e0–e5–e10–e20–e30–e50–e75–e100–
e150–e200–e250). Payment scales have been shown to be more valid than
open-ended formats, because of higher completion rates and less zero values
(Donaldson et al., 1997; Whynes et al., 2003).
Table 2. Knowledge of and experience with the no-claim rebate (n ¼ 182)
N (%)
Are you familiar with the no-claim rebate? No 21 (11.5)
Yes 161 (88.5)
Are the following statements about the no-claim rebate true? a
1. GP visits are deducted from the no-claim b 127 (78.9)
2. The costs of prescribed medication are deducted from the
no-claim rebate c
103 (64.0)
3. Only persons of 18 years and older are eligible for the no-claim
rebate c
110 (68.3)
4. The maximum yearly rebate is e320 b 146 (90.7)
5. The no-claim rebate is only remitted the year after c 139 (86.3)
6. If you want to receive the no-claim rebate, you have to claim it
b
146 (90.7)
7. The goal of the no-claim rebate is to reduce use of care c 121 (75.2)
Did you receive a no-claim rebate this year? No / don’t
know
120 (65.9)
Yes 62 (34.1)
Did the introduction of the no-claim rebate increase your cost-
consciousness?
No 143 (78.6)
Yes 39 (21.4)
Did you at any time hesitate to use care or consider to postpone or not
use care, in view of the no-claim rebate?
No 167 (91.8)
Yes 15 (8.2)
Did you actually use less care as a consequence of the introduction of the
no-claim rebate?
No 175 (96.2)
Yes 7 (3.8)
Notes: a only asked to respondents who indicated they were familiar with the no-claim rebate; numbers of
respondents with correct answer (and proportion of sub-sample); mean proportion was 79.2% correct.
b false.
c true.
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Finally, to examine people’s willingness to postpone (WTPP) care near the
end of the year, we included two scenarios in the questionnaire, one involving
blood pressure medication and the other about a visit to an orthopedist. In
each of the two scenario’s respondents were faced with three different cases
for which they had to decide whether they would be willing to postpone health
care consumption for two weeks or a month until 1 January of the next year in
order to keep their entitlement to the full no-claim rebate over the current year
(see Table 5).
The six cases were used to construct a willingness to postpone scale (n ¼ 177;
Cronbach’s a: 0.85). About 25% of the sample (46 respondents) were unwilling
to postpone health care consumption in all six cases, leading to a score of 0;
about 20% of the sample (35 respondents) indicated they would be willing to
postpone in all six cases, leading to a score of 6. Mean score was 3.1.
We analyze both the WTPP and the WTA, as well as the relationship
between the two.
4. Results
Knowledge
The results with respect to the knowledge about the no-claim rebate are
reported in Table 2. Relative to previous studies, the general knowledge of
the scheme was better in our sample. Most statements were scored correctly
by more than 75% of the respondents and almost half (46%) of the sample
answered at least six out of seven statements correctly. Statistically significant
higher knowledge scores were observed for respondents with higher net income
(5.1 vs. 3.7; p<0.001), who had received a no-claim rebate over the previous
year (5.4 vs. 4.1; p<0.001) and those who were not in favour of the no-claim
rebate (5.1 vs. 4.3; p ¼ 0.017). Multivariate analysis showed that having a
chronic ailment, higher net income, having received a no-claim rebate over
the previous year, and not being in favour of the no-claim rebate were asso-
ciated with higher knowledge scores (adj. R2 ¼ 0.19). Note that higher net
income may be a proxy for a higher level of education here. Given that the
healthy are overrepresented in our sample, this may have lowered the propor-
tion of well-informed people compared to the general population. It must be
noted that the methods of recruitment and location of respondents may also
have biased our results.
Attitude
Table 3 provides an overview of how our sample responded to the different atti-
tude statements regarding the no-claim. As can be seen, about half of the
respondents do not consider the no-claim to be fair. Likewise, a majority of
the respondents rejects the idea that the chronically ill have to pay more than
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healthy people and agree that higher income groups have to pay more for health
care. In line with a previous study (De Jong et al., 2006), respondents indicate
that they themselves do not use unnecessary care but expect that others do.
Analyzing these responses using factor analysis revealed two main types of atti-
tudes towards the no-claim rebate. People with the first type of attitude (48.5%
of the sample) perceived the no-claim rebate to be unfair and ineffective in
increasing cost-consciousness or in reducing use of care. They held the opinion
that payment for care should not be related to care use, thought that people are
unlikely to use unnecessary care, and did not feel that healthy people are more
entitled to a rebate. These people tended to be against the no-claim rebate. By
contrast, people with the second type of attitude (51.5% of the sample) per-
ceived the no-claim rebate to be a fair policy. They held the opinion that the
rich should not necessarily pay more for health care than the poor, did not con-
sider it to be unfair that unhealthy people have higher costs than healthy people,
did not feel people with a chronic ailment should be compensated for the fact
that they always lose out on their rebate, and did not expect the no-claim rebate
to lead to negative health effects. These people tended to be in favour of the no-
claim rebate. Being in favour of the no-claim rebate (people of type 2) was asso-
ciated with lower age (p<0.001), not having children (p<0.001), currently not
having an ailment for which care is needed (p ¼ 0.009), not having a chronic
ailment (p ¼ 0.013), higher health status (p ¼ 0.004), and lower knowledge
of the no-claim rebate (p ¼ 0.017). Since our sample consists of an overrepre-
sentation of young and healthy people, the proportion in the general population
that would consider the no-claim rebate as being unfair is likely to be larger
than in our sample. On the other hand, there may also be a self-selection effect
in the opposite direction if people who perceive the no-claim as unfair were
more inclined to participate in our survey.
Sensitivity
Regarding sensitivity, respondents elicited sizeable mean WTA values (see Table
4). In all three scenarios the number of respondents who would consume the
health service even if this meant they would lose the full no-claim rebate at
once is much larger than the number of respondents who were unwilling to
accept any loss, implying that the no-claim rebate would not constrain their
demand at all. Table 4 also shows bivariate and multivariate associations
with WTA: for instance, respondents who indicated that the introduction of
the no-claim rebate increased their cost-consciousness elicited a lower WTA,
as did respondents who were more willing to postpone health care consumption
until after 1 January in order to maintain their rebate.
As depicted in Figure 3, 88% of respondents was willing to accept a reduc-
tion in their rebate for all three services (GP visits, lung X-rays, and penicillin),
with mean WTA of e 86, e131, and e78 respectively. Correlation coefficients
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between the three WTA values ranged between 0.61 and 0.76. Only a small
group (4%) was not willing to accept any deduction from their rebate.
Finally, we found evidence of a substantial willingness to postpone care con-
sumption up to a month. As shown in Table 5, WTPP tends to increase with the
absolute and relative size of the no-claim rebate loss and if the postponement
reduces from one month to two weeks. In the case of blood pressure medica-
tion, many variables were associated with willingness to postpone care con-
sumption, but especially individuals who indicated reluctance to use care
because of the rebate were substantially more willing to postpone care. In the
case of referral to an orthopedist, individual characteristics like civil status, hav-
ing children, and income were more prominent.5
Table 6 provides insight in the relationship between WTPP and WTA. One
would expect people with a higher willingness to postpone care also to be less
willing to accept decreases in the no-claim rebate, thus leading to a lower
WTA. Table 6 shows that this relationship indeed exists: a higher willingness
to postpone is associated with a significantly lower willingness to accept
decreases in the no-claim rebate.
5. Discussion
The no-claim scheme was proposed by the government as a friendly alternative
to traditional cost sharing in an attempt to increase the cost awareness among
buyers while relaxing constraints on supply and prices. First projections of the
5 The latter finding is somewhat surprising, as one would have expected people with higher incomes to
have a lower marginal utility of money, making postponement less attractive. A plausible explanation for
this, however, is that income functions as a proxy for educational level and that higher educated people
are more confident regarding own judgments when it concerns health.
Figure 3. Health services use at cost of no-claim rebate
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behavioural effects were favourable (CPB, 2004), but based on unrealistic
assumptions. Already before the actual introduction of the scheme, there were
serious doubts about its potential effectiveness in containing costs (Schut,
2004). The first evaluations showed that while some patients may have reacted
by restricting the use of health services, this number was very small and no real
evidence of reduced consumption was found. Moreover, many people appeared
to be poorly informed about the details of the scheme. Therefore, the most
prominent effect of the no-claim rebate was a redistributional effect, involving
a transfer of money from the sick to the healthy.
Our study sheds some more light on the effects of the no-claim. Using a ques-
tionnaire, we investigated (i) people’s knowledge, (ii) people’s attitude, and (iii)
people’s sensitivity to the no-claim rebate scheme, including postponement
behaviour.
Regarding knowledge, the majority (88%) of our respondents indicated that
they were familiar with the no-claim rebate, similar to the 89% and 87%
reported in the studies by Goudriaan et al. (2006, 2007). As in the previous
studies (de Jong, 2006; Goudriaan et al., 2006, 2007), however, knowledge
regarding the details of the scheme was imperfect. Nevertheless, 46% of respon-
dents answered at least six out of seven statements correctly. This percentage is
higher than those in the evaluations by Goudriaan et al. (2006, 2007). This may
be partly explained by differences in the statements and partly by differences in
the sample.
Regarding attitude, it is clear that people were divided about the fairness of
the no-claim rebate. About half of the respondents considered the instrument
to be unfair, although most respondents (78.5%) agreed that other people
sometimes consume unnecessary care (whereas only 11% agreed with the state-
ment that they themselves occasionally consume unnecessary care). Almost
80% of respondents indicated that they expected that people would be more
sensitive to direct payments than to the no-claim rebate.
Table 6. Willingness to accept (WTA) according to willingness to postpone (n = 167)
Health service Willingness to postpone a
Low High P-value
% Sample Mean WTA S.D. % Sample Mean WTA S.D.
GP visit 54% 92 93.2 46% 64 82.0 < 0.05
Lung X-ray 54% 142 95.7 46% 107 89.7 < 0.02
Penicillin 53% 87 92.0 47% 53 68.2 < 0.02
Notes: a Willingness to postpone was defined as being low if a respondent opted to postpone in no more
than three of the six scenarios presented in Table 5 and as being high otherwise.
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Regarding sensitivity, we found a substantial willingness to accept (WTA) a
reduction of the no-claim rebate for obtaining various types of health care.
Our results may even underestimate the true WTA, because a significant num-
ber of people indicated that they would accept the highest value on the pre-
sented payment scale (e250). This holds particularly for the lung X-ray,
where 58 respondents (32%) chose the highest presented value. The high will-
ingness to accept a reduction of the no-claim rebate indicates that people
were not very sensitive to this type of financial incentive to reduce consumption.
This conclusion is also supported by the fact that about 70% of the respondents
agreed with the proposition that direct cash payments would result in a larger
reduction of care consumption than the no-claim rebate (see Table 3). Only
4% of the respondents indicated not to accept a lower rebate in any case (see
Figure 3) – similar to the 3% and 5% reported previously (Goudriaan et al.,
2006; 2007). In the three presented scenarios on average 22% of the respon-
dents (19% in GP visit scenario, 32% in Lung X-ray scenario, and 16% in Peni-
cillin scenario; see Table 4) indicated that they were willing to accept a loss of
e250 (about the maximum no-claim rebate), implying that the no-claim rebate
would not constrain their demand at all.
Regarding postponement behaviour, we found that a substantial proportion
(about 60%) of the respondents were willing to postpone care for at least two
weeks if that could leave their current rebate intact, and that a higher WTPP
was consistently associated with a lower WTA. The fact that many people
had both substantial WTA and WTPP values, suggests that people are much
more prepared to delay than to reduce health care consumption. It should be
noted, however, that the WTPP may be overstated because a decision to post-
pone utilization in a hypothetical situation is easier than when one is actually
sick or suffering (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2003; Marka and Swait, 2004).
Moreover, the WTPP may also be biased by the possibility that in the hypothet-
ical scenarios people received more information than they may in practice, mak-
ing the trade-off between refund and care use clearer and more explicit than in
practice.
Finally, we would like to point to some limitations of our study. First, like
the only comparable previous study, we had to use hypothetical scenarios and
people’s own retrospective perceptions regarding health care consumption.
Since the no-claim rebate was mandatory, we could not infer the effectiveness
of the no-claim from data about actual health care utilization, since a control
group without entitlement to a no-claim rebate was lacking. Moreover, we
used only a limited number of hypothetical scenarios. Using more scenarios
(for instance in a discrete choice experiment) would have produced additional
information. Second, the way we framed the study, the scenarios and questions
may have influenced answers. For example, whether the payment scale ade-
quately reflects decision making under the no-claim scheme may be questioned,
particularly if people base their answers on expected future health care
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consumption. A third limitation is the use of a relatively small convenience sam-
ple that is not entirely representative for the general population and for which
we cannot rule out potential selection bias. All these aspects hamper the gener-
alizability of our results. Nonetheless, our results are quite similar to compar-
able findings of a previous study (de Jong et al., 2006).
Concluding remarks
Our findings indicate that the no-claim rebate provided only a very weak
incentive to reduce care consumption. The main effect, therefore, was a redis-
tribution from the sick to the healthy, which is perceived by many people as
unfair. Moreover, our study shows a potential danger of strategic postponement
of care, which may have adverse health effects. In sum, for society the no-claim
rebate resulted in some pain, but no gain.
In 2007 the Dutch government, faced with rising costs in health care and the
ineffectiveness of the no-claim rebate policy, decided to replace it with a man-
datory deductible of e150 per year in 2008 (Ministry of Health, 2007). Polit-
ically, the replacement of the no-claim rebate with a mandatory deductible
was attractive and did not encounter strong opposition because the immediate
effect was a reduction in health insurance premiums. This is because the sur-
charge on the premium to finance the no-claim rebate could be replaced by a
discount on the premium due to higher (future) out-of-pocket payments.
Although the net effect on total payments was the same, in the short run people
only experienced a reduction of their health insurance premium. Moreover, to
mitigate unfavourable redistributional effects, the government decided to com-
pensate the chronically ill for the expected additional expenses (e40 per year)
relative to an average non-chronically ill individual. These compensatory pay-
ments, however, are likely to increase the administrative costs of the new
scheme. In addition, the savings related to the deductible are likely to be small
because, again, GP services are excluded from the proposed deductible scheme.
So, just as in the case of the no-claim rebate, by trying to avoid any pain the
new deductible scheme is unlikely to generate any substantial gain.
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